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‘Aesthetic engagement’ could be heard blandly: as a portmanteau 
term for our aesthetic attitudes, stances and comportment to-
wards the natural world. Or it could be serving as an alternative 
to ‘artistic engagement’: referring, therefore, to ‘environmental 
art’, landscape architecture, garden design, and so on. Or – and 
this is how I shall be taking the expression – it could indicate 
a particular and rather fashionable conception of the aesthetics 
of nature that owes primarily to Arnold Berleant in his book Art 
and Engagement (1991) and many related articles (eg. 1993 and 
2002). These days one hears a lot of the ‘engagement model’ of 
appreciation of nature.
After a brief resumé of Berleant and his followers’ proposal, I 
shall argue that this proposal is both less novel and less threaten-
ing to ‘traditional aesthetics’ than they imagine. I shall go on, in 
the more ‘constructive’ half of the paper, to recommend to you 
a mode of aesthetic appreciation of nature to which, I think, the 
engagement model is inhospitable.
The engagement model belongs to – indeed has inspired – what 
Berleant calls ‘the new fi eld of environmental aesthetics’ (2002: 
3), and is contrasted by him with one rooted in what he sees as 
the ‘traditional aesthetics’ of art. The latter, he argues, is a bad 
model even in the domain of art, let alone that of nature. (Indeed, 
one of Berleant’s main ambitions – though not one I shall discuss 
– is to ‘reinterpret the artistic aesthetic by the natural’ one that he 
has developed (1993: 228).) The defi ning feature of ‘traditional 
aesthetics’ – whose most conspicuous champion, for Berleant, 
was Kant – is its embrace of ‘the contemplative ideal’ (1993: 230). 
According to this ideal, the aesthetic appreciator – whether of 
artworks or natural places – should be a passive, disinterested 
and, in a double sense, ‘objectifying’ contemplator (1993: 229f). It 
is upon discrete, isolated, distanced, and ‘framed’ objects that his 
attention should rest, and these are objects in the further sense of 
being set over against subjects, and not anything that we ‘partici-
pate’ in, are ‘assimilated’ into, or have ‘unity’ with (1993: 234ff). 
Every aspect of the contemplative model, argues Berleant, 
should be rejected – at least in the domain of natural apprecia-
tion. When we ‘deal with beauty in nature’, he tells us, we are 
typically ‘active’ – ‘physically participating’, ‘somatically en-
gaged’ – and ‘surrounded by the “object”’, not passively staring 
at some ‘framed’ object before us (2002: 231f). Typically, there 
is a relation, not of ‘distance’, but of ‘continuity’, ‘assimilation’, 
‘participation’ and ‘unity’ between subject and object: in effect, a 
dissol ution of the subject/object distinction. Partly for these rea-
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sons, our stance toward natural beauty is not disinterested. And 
there are other reasons for this: as one admirer of Berleant puts 
it, when writing of garden appreciation, ‘from the point of view 
of disinterest, [this] is too enmeshed in our purposes and needs’ 
(Miller 1993: 99) – and the same will go for less cultivated nature, 
where we are typically involved as backpackers, say, or canoeists. 
Berleant concludes that ‘the aesthetic mark’ in our relations with 
nature ‘is not disinterested contemplation but total engagement’ 
(1993:237). Nature provides us, not with ‘objects’ admiringly to 
view, but ‘occasions’ for sensory, somatic, imaginative and other 
modes of activity.
II
Does this engagement model provide a ‘new’ and viable environ-
mental aesthetics or aesthetics of nature? In my judgement, it 
offers little that is new and, where it perhaps does, it is not vi-
able. When ‘traditional aesthetics’, like Kant’s, is rescued from the 
engagement theorists’ misunderstandings, it is perfectly compa-
tible with some aspects of the engagement model. What it is not 
compatible with – to its credit, however – are some exaggerated 
claims that champions of engagement often make. Let’s begin 
with these.
Consider, fi rst, the insistence that natural appreciation is ‘too 
enmeshed in our purposes and needs’ ever to be disinterested 
– that, as two authors put it, ‘utility and form, perception and 
use’ are too diffi cult to separate for the ‘contemplative ideal’ to 
be approached (Kemal and Gaskell 1993: 33). But the ordinary 
backpacker – if not the intrepid kayaker riding the rapids – is 
surely able to set aside whatever utilitarian purposes and needs, 
such as getting fi t, may have motivated his expedition, and dis-
interestedly (in Kant’s sense) to enjoy the scenery around him. 
That something is ‘enmeshed’ in our practical purposes does not 
preclude a disinterested aesthetic regard for it. If it did, no painter 
or gardener could ever pause, take stock and objectively appraise 
the fruits of their labour.
Consider, second, the claim that our ‘unity’ or ‘assimilation’ 
with nature in engaged experience of it is so great that the ‘very 
foundation of modern [ie. ‘traditional’] aesthetic theory’ – ‘the 
subject/object dichotomy’ – ‘collapses’ (Miller 1993: 178). Now 
there are, of course, bad accounts of the subject/object distinction 
that refl ections, like Heidegger’s on our engaged ‘being-in-the-
world’, may help to refute. And it is true, as we shall see later, that 
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there are experiences of nature which understandably elicit talk, 
however inadequate and vague, of a ‘oneness with nature’. But, 
with most of us surely, the head begins to swim when we read 
that there is no distinction between subjects and objects. How 
could anyone deny a distinction between conscious persons and 
the world of things of which they are conscious? Kant and other 
‘traditionalists’ were not, as far as I can see, committed by their 
aesthetics to any particular account of that distinction, but in ac-
cepting that the distinction cannot be ‘collapsed’, they are surely 
on the side of good sense.
Stripped of such exaggerated claims as the two just mentioned, 
there is little or nothing in the engagement model that the tra-
ditional one, when properly understood, is unable to accommo-
date. Champions of the former model are guilty, above all, of 
misconstruing the notion of disinterestedness in roughly, if not 
precisely, Kant’s sense. Accurately construed, disinterestedness 
in that sense is not incompatible with several aspects of ‘engaged’ 
aesthetic appreciation. This is just as well for the champions of 
engagement, since it is hard to see how appreciation could count 
as aesthetic were it not disinterested in something like Kant’s 
sense. Malcolm Budd is right to maintain that it is necessary to 
any aesthetic response that it is not a function of ‘a desire’ – prac-
tical, moral, utilitarian - that the world should be a certain way’ 
(2002: 111). 
What is diffi cult to see is that disinterestedness, so under-
stood, should require, as Berleant imagines it does, aesthetic ap-
preciation of nature to be the ‘passive’ contemplation of discrete, 
‘framed’ objects set at a distance from the observer – and nor, to 
my knowledge, did the great aestheticians of the 18th and 19th 
centuries require this. (Nor, of course, did they exclude the pos-
sibility that aesthetic experiences might be of that kind, and it is 
surely peculiar for engagement theorists to give the impression 
that backpackers and others communicants with nature never 
just ‘passively’ look at natural objects, like a fl ower or a rock, 
standing before them in the way that a literally ‘framed’ work in 
a art gallery might.) 
While it is possible to cite passages from Shaftesbury or the 
phenomenon of the ‘Claude glass’ in support of the idea that aes-
thetic appreciation must be of discrete, ‘framed’ objects, it is clear 
that this idea was not generally shared in the 18th century. Kant 
certainly did not share it, for his items of appreciation include 
such ‘un-framed’ – indeed, un-object-like – ones as the changing 
shapes of a fi re and rippling brooks (1952: 89). And nor, for ex-
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ample, did enthusiasts for the informal ‘English’ style of land-
scape design. The point of Horace Walpole’s famous remark that 
William Kent ‘leaped the fence and saw that all Nature was a gar-
den’ was precisely that Kent, like ‘Capability’ Brown later, had, as 
it were, ‘de-framed’ the garden so as to let its boundaries indistin-
guishably merge with its uncultivated surroundings (Qu. in Hunt 
and Willis 1988: 313).
Nor was it a ‘traditional’ maxim that objects of aesthetic ap-
preciation should be set at a distance before the observer. Most 
18th century writers on nature would, I suspect, be as puzzled 
as Ronald Hepburn is today by the suggestion that, when we are 
‘in’ nature – surrounded by, immersed in, it – our experience of 
it cannot be contemplative and disinterested (see especially Hep-
burn1984). There is no good reason to suppose that Kant, for one, 
subscribed to any such maxim, either in connection with nature 
or art appreciation. In the latter case, for example, he distinguish-
es a ‘mere piece of sculpture, made simply to be looked at’ from 
architectural works, designed for ‘public concourse’ and dwelling 
– ones, that is, which we are ‘in’ (1952: 186f).
Nor, fi nally, does disinterestedness require that the admirer of 
natural scenes must be ‘passive’ – either physically, by just staring, 
immobile, at them or mentally, by simply receiving, like a blank 
tablet, what is given by them to the senses. 18th century English 
parklands, for example, were designed to be enjoyed on the move 
– offering surprises and changing vistas to the walker or rider. 
And some of them provided ‘emblems’ or ‘narratives’ – that of the 
Aeneid in the case of Stourhead – which the visitor was intended 
actively to decipher or engage with. It would be strange, more-
over, to describe Kant – for whom aesthetic pleasure resides in a 
highly active and ‘free play’ of the imagination and understand-
ing – as supposing that aesthetic appreciation is a ‘passive’ affair. 
Berleant, recall, contrasts the passive contemplation of ‘objects’ 
with the active, engaged appreciation prompted by ‘occasions’. 
But ‘occasion’ would not be a bad label for what Kant himself sup-
poses that appropriate items provide: stimuli for that ‘free play’ 
in which, at the end of the day, aesthetic pleasure is taken.
Let me now turn to the notion of contemplation, for it is the 
‘contemplative ideal’ of ‘traditional aesthetics’ that, recall, the 
champions of engagement explicitly oppose. While they do not, 
as far as I can tell, explain in any detail what they mean by ‘con-
templation’, it seems that by linking it with passivity, objectifi ca-
tion and so on, they have in mind a rather particular form among 
the many forms of activity (or non-activity) that can be described 
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as ‘contemplation’. The picture seems to be that of the physically 
and mentally stilled observer merely looking at some discrete 
item. If so, then it is not what Kant and many other older writers 
intended by ‘contemplation’. Kant uses ‘contemplative’ as a virtu-
al synonym for ‘disinterested’ – as when he contrasts the ‘merely 
contemplative’ with what is ‘practical’ in the sense of ‘bring[ing] 
about an interest in the object’ (1952: 64). If therefore, as I argued 
above, disinterestedness is compatible with an engaged aesthetic 
stance, so is Kantian contemplation. Or consider Ruskin’s notion 
of contemplation. Contrasted with ‘the mere … consciousness of 
… pleasantness’ is an ‘exulting, reverent, and grateful’ experience 
of it which Ruskin describes as ‘full comprehension and contem-
plation of the Beautiful’ (1903–12, Vol. 4:42). Contemplation so 
characterized hardly sounds to be disengaged spectating – an 
impression confi rmed when Ruskin equates it with the Greek no-
tion of theoria. Whatever the theoria-ist is indulging in, it is not 
mere spectatorship. 
Contemplation, in short, is an elastic notion, and there are 
modes of contemplation, like Ruskin’s, that are not captured by 
the engagement’s theorist’s talk of ‘the contemplative ideal’ and 
which, indeed, are perfectly compatible with the idea of an en-
gaged aesthetic relationship to nature. Doubtless, too, there are 
modes of contemplation less compatible with this. Indeed, in the 
remainder of this paper, I focus on a mode to which, it seems 
to me, the engagement model is at any rate inhospitable – and 
regrettably so, for I want to recommend this form of contempla-
tion as an important aspect, for some people at least, of aesthetic 
appreciation of the natural world. (I won’t be returning to the 
issue of the engagement model’s inability to welcome this mode 
of contemplation: so let me just record my impression that the 
model is too muscular and activist – too ‘masculine’, one might 
say – to accord importance to this mode.)
III
There is a valuable insight into the aesthetics of nature that goes 
back at least to Adorno, who identifi ed an ‘essential indetermi-
nateness’ in the appreciation of ‘natural beauty’ (1997: 70), un-
constrained as this is by the considerations of tradition, genre, 
and artistic intention germane to art appreciation. Malcolm Budd 
puts the point well when he refers to a freedom ‘integral to the 
aesthetic appreciation of nature … which means that much more 
is up to the aesthetic observer of nature than of art, a freedom 
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which is one aspect of nature’s distinctive aesthetic appeal’ (2002: 
148). It is, you could say, one aspect of that one aspect that I would 
now like to bring out. 
The aspect I have in mind is a mode of contemplation that 
two inspirations for my ensuing remarks – Rousseau and Gas-
ton Bachelard – describe as ‘rêverie’. (Bachelard’s translator pre-
fers ‘day-dreaming’, but that word has connotations of absent- or 
empty-mindedness not intended by the two Frenchmen’s term 
rêverie.) When, writes Rousseau, he walks through nature in 
reverie, his head is ‘entirely free and … [his] ideas follow their 
bent without resistance or constraint’, which is why reverie is 
‘pure and disinterested contemplation’ (1992: 12, 94). Reverie, 
for Bachelard, in taking us into ‘the space of elsewhere’, is ‘orig-
inal contemplation’, whereby ‘we open the world’ up to ourselves 
(1994: 184). For both authors, then, reverie is a form – perhaps 
the most important form – of contemplation. 
Reverie, as I – and to a large extent my two mentors – under-
stand it, is characterized by at least the three following, related 
properties. First, and perhaps foremost, it is a state of what might 
be called ‘self-disengagement’, not only in the sense that, in rever-
ie, attention is not focused upon oneself, but because the thoughts, 
ideas, images or whatever which occur ‘follow their own bent’, 
unpiloted by the agent or subject. This, perhaps, is what Bache-
lard meant in referring to reverie as taking us into ‘the space of 
elsewhere’, and it is a point made explicit by Rousseau, who ‘nev-
er dream[s] more deliciously than when [he] forget[s] [him]self’ 
(1992: 95). Mute and unthematized as this self-disengagement is 
during reverie, it is a condition that, when ‘recollected in tranquil-
lity’, not unnaturally prompts the rhetoric of ‘oneness’ or ‘unity’ 
with nature. When, however, Rousseau speaks of feeling himself 
‘one with’ this ‘beautiful system’ (1992: 92), or Bachelard of ‘a feel-
ing of participation in a fl owing onward’ (1994: xvi), they are not 
proclaiming – and nor am I – the ‘collapse of the subject/object 
dichotomy’. The point, rather, is to lend poetic force to the com-
pleteness of the ‘un-selfi ng’, as Iris Murdoch calls it (1997: 375ff), 
that takes place in reverie, and to the sense thereby induced, per-
haps, that we subjects, like the objects before us, may owe our 
being to a single, encompassing ‘ground’ or ‘source’.
Second, when Rousseau remarks that ‘everything which per-
tains to … [his] needs … spoils his reverie, and laments that there 
are those who ‘no longer see in plants anything but instruments 
of our passions [and] practical concerns’ (1992: 94, 99), he makes 
plain that reverie must be disinterested, in the relevant, broadly 
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Kantian sense. Perhaps this is why Bachelard seems, rightly or 
not, to privilege the experience of forests over cultivated, tilled 
fi elds: the latter, involved as they are with our practical concerns, 
are too much ‘with-me, with-us’ to facilitate pure reverie (1994: 
188). Notice that, for neither thinker, does disinterestedness re-
quire physical distance from ‘framed’ objects: Rousseau’s reveries 
accompany his walking through forests and valleys. 
Finally, reverie is to be contrasted with at least the more gruel-
ing and ‘heavyweight’ forms of refl ection – from thinking some-
thing through, reasoning to a conclusion, deliberation, and so 
on. ‘Reverie relaxes and amuses me’, remarks Rousseau, whereas 
refl ection ‘tires’ and thinking has ‘always been painful for’ him 
(1992: 91). For Bachelard, the person in reverie is not concerned 
to examine the ‘causality’ of the images that present themselves, 
but stands open to their ‘reverbrations’ (1994: xv). Reverie is 
alto gether freer, more fl uid, less ‘intentional’ than other, more 
regimented or ‘cognitive’ forms of refl ection. It is looser, less cris-
pated even than Kant’s ‘free play of the imagination and under-
standing’, of which it nevertheless has clear echoes.
Here are a couple of examples of reveries, prompted by en-
counters with nature that illustrate a style of contemplation 
whose neglect in the academic literature belies its familiarity. 
One, belonging to his ‘philosophical phenomenology of nests’, 
comes from Bachelard. The bird-nest he examines is a ‘precarious 
thing’, but it may nevertheless ‘set us to daydreaming of secu-
rity’, even arousing a sense of ‘cosmic confi dence in the world’, 
fragile a place as that is too. And it may evoke images of a ‘happy 
household’ – our own, with any luck – as a ‘fl ourishing nest’, its 
members as close and cosy as the birds in their nest. And from 
there our imagery may extend to a picture of the world itself as 
‘the nest of mankind’ – a protective place that to the child at least 
is one of ‘well-being’ and intimacy (1994: 97ff). A second example 
comes from myself who, in the best empiricist spirit, went for 
some walks at the time of writing this paper to confi rm the role of 
reverie in my own enjoyment of nature. (Not easy to do, inciden-
tally, since my intended abandonment to reverie was prone to be 
obstructed by awareness of what it was that I intended to do.) So 
what happened, then, when, leaning on a gate to a fi eld, I looked 
about me? Well, nothing dramatic, and nothing as profound, 
probably, as Bachelard’s musings on the cosmic signifi cance of 
bird-nests. But here, in somewhat stream of consciousness prose, 
is my recollection of one short sequence of experiences: slowly 
panning a hillside beyond the fi eld, my eyes dwell on some cows. 
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Do they get bored eating grass all the time? Are they as miserable 
as they look, or is theirs the truly contented life? I don’t grapple 
with these questions. Instead my eyes wander to the fi eld, re-
cently ploughed; thick lumps of ‘gingerbread soil’ – a phrase of 
Karel Capek’s, whose charming book on gardening comes briefl y 
to mind. Images of the many different sorts of soil that farmers 
and gardeners deal with. The imagery is interrupted by shadows 
of clouds scudding over the fi eld, blown by the wind that is also, 
I notice, rippling the surface of the nearby river. That surface is 
very pleasing. Why?, I wonder, and briefl y enquire whether Kant 
could explain it, for it isn’t, it strikes me, either sublime or beauti-
ful by his criteria. Back to the munching cows, but unsuccessfully, 
for the thought of Kant recalls me to the paper I am writing for 
the Nordic Society of Aesthetics.
IV
If I am to succeed in recommending reverie to you as an impor-
tant aspect of the aesthetic appreciation of nature, I need to per-
suade you of two things: fi rst that nature is an especially appro-
priate source and object of reverie, and second that reverie is an 
authentically aesthetic engagement with nature. Time prevents 
my saying anything about the former, beyond remarking that I 
am not claiming that only nature appropriately invites reverie. 
(Most of Bachelard’s The Poetics of Space is, in fact, concerned 
with the reveries prompted by built places – cellars, attics and 
other ‘felicitous spaces’.) But I do want to say a little about the aes-
thetic credentials of reverie induced by encounters with natural 
places and things.
Might we not justly accuse someone standing before a paint-
ing of a bird-nest or ploughed fi eld by Constable, say, of failing 
in his aesthetic duty towards the painting if he allowed his mind 
freely to wander – to ‘day-dream’ – in the manner of Bachelard 
and myself in the examples I described above? Wouldn’t such 
fancies be irrelevant, or worse, to a proper attention to, say, the 
painterly merits of the work or its fi delity to a genre of painting? 
So doesn’t reverie detract from authentic artistic appreciation? 
Perhaps, but then we need to recall the Adorno-Budd insight that 
a main difference between nature and art appreciation is that the 
former is less ‘determinate’, more ‘free’. The appreciator of nature 
is altogether less constrained by, as it were, duties of appropriate 
attention. And I want to suggest, more positively, that reverie in 
nature is typically characterized by features that render it – ex-
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cept on parti pris or axe-grinding conceptions of the aesthetic 
– an aesthetic dimension of engagement with nature.
To begin with, reverie in the company of nature involves ais-
thesis, the engagement and alertness of the senses: for it is the 
look and feel of the warm, rounded nest – or the sound and sight 
of the wind rippling the surface of the river – that induce and at-
tract reveries like those sketched. Second, it is, as already shown, 
a disinterested mode of experience, free from preoccupation with 
one’s purposes and needs. Disinterested sensory receptivity is al-
ready, surely, a putative mark of the aesthetic character of reverie. 
There is more to say, though. 
Aesthetic engagement or experience is something that, by and 
large, is valued. If it were not, then we would not, I suspect, spill 
so much ink writing about the aesthetic and discussing it at con-
ferences like the one this paper was written for. I suspect, as well, 
that we value it for at least three roughly distinguishable reasons. 
First, much of it is enjoyable, pleasurable. Second, much aesthetic 
experience is – or is of – what is good and wholesome for human 
beings: it can edify. Third, some of it is – or is of – what is deep 
and of genuine human signifi cance.
 I want to say that reverie, by and large, is something to value 
for the same reasons. Typically, as we know from Rousseau, it 
‘relaxes and amuses’: it can be ‘charming’ or ‘delicious’, ‘tranquil’ 
or ‘diverting’. Second, it is often, though not always, good and 
wholesome: for it is generally good to allow the imagination to 
fl ow, to renew one’s contacts with the living world around one, 
and to ‘unself’ or ‘forget oneself’. This may even be a moral good, 
for, as Iris Murdoch, for one, has argued, we can expect little from 
a person incapable of a ‘selfl ess respect’ for what stands outside 
his or her sphere of practical concerns. Finally, some reveries 
in ‘felicitous space’ – Bachelard’s in front of the bird-nest, if not 
mine leaning on the farmer’s gate – are deep: they may show us 
something about the world and ourselves. It may even be – to 
leave the last word to Bachelard – that ‘the values that mark rev-
erie mark humanity in its depths’ (1994:6).
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